Exams

I just got my results for my mid-term test for PHI220: Body & Mind and, to my delight, I received 100%. The test was simple and consisted of five questions in multiple choice and short answer which I'll post below with my answers.

Q.1.

Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that:

A) Mental properties are causally inert
B) We don't have privileged access to our own mental states
C) Mental states are neither material nor immaterial
D) It is a category mistake to think that 'the mind' refers to a substance
E) All mental states are phenomenal states

Q.2.

J.J.C. Smart advances the identity theory, according to which sensations are brain processes, as:

A) an a priori claim whose truth can be established by an analysis of mental concepts
B) a claim that we can see must be true even if we have no idea how it can be true
C) a claim that must be true because its denial-dualism-is unintelligible
D) an empirical speculation that has little chance of being true
E) a plausible empirical claim

Q.3.

Explain why Putnam discusses the mental life of other animals-such as the octopus-in arguing against the claim that mental states are brain states.

Putnam argues that the brain-state theorist, to make good his claims, needs to specify a physical-chemical state so that any organism is in pain, necessarily and sufficiently, if it possess a brain of a suitable physical-chemical composition and its brain is actually in that physical-chemical state. This is not limited to just mammalian brains but any organism that has the potential to experience pain which, while sufficiently including mammals, also includes reptiles and molluscs (octopus), for example, as well. Putnam uses this example to illustrate the ambitiousness of the brain-state hypothesis claiming that the brain-state theorist does not just claim that pain is a brain state but that all psychological states are brain states. Putnam claims that if we can find a single psychological state that can be applied to both a mammal and an octopus, for example, and that the physical-chemical correlate is different between the two then brain-state theory collapses. Putnam thinks that this is 'overwhelmingly probable'.

Q.4.

Explain in a few sentences how the functionalist account of mental states differs from the behaviorist account of mental states.

Ned Block describes Functionalism as 'a new incarnation of behaviorism' because while there are many similarities between Functionalism and Behaviorism there is a difference in their ascription of mental states. For Behaviorism to be met a mental state consists of a disposition to act in certain ways relative to a certain set of input-output relationships, however Functionalism goes further. Functionalism also requires that internal (mental) processes will have a causal relationship with other internal (mental) processes and, at the same time, have a causal relationship with external input-output relationships. Functionalism therefore claims that mental states may be seen as causal 'objects' while Behaviorism only sees sensory inputs, or external causes (input-output relationships), as causally significant.

Q.5.

Block uses the example of the homunculi-headed robots to argue that functionalism is wrong because it:

A) is too liberal in its ascription of mental states
B) has no plausible account of mental causation
C) reduces to behaviorism
D) cannot give a plausible account of privileged access
E) is consistent with dualism