A Morally Relative New-Year's

Well, it's been a while since I've posted on here. Being busy with holidays and summer school, southern hemisphere remember. I hope you enjoy my philosophical take on new-year's. And do remember to VOTE FOR ME!

Writing a Philosophy entry that has a new-year’s theme really got me thinking. I was really quite stumped as to how this time of year, or the concept of this time of year, had much to do with philosophy at all. What I have chosen to write about I stumbled across while reading my course material for a subject I’m currently undertaking at University. This has little to do with the ‘stuff’ of new-year’s but much to do with the concept, I suppose. What I am going to be discussing is meta-ethical moral relativism. I don’t particularly agree with all of the premises of moral relativism but I will use it, here, to illustrate the new-year’s concept.

It may be put, and validly so, that morality, or more specifically moral relativism, has little to do with the concept of new-year’s. I’m sure there will be little debate that moral theory could be applied to the happenings of new-year’s though. I am sticking with moral relativism, though, because it effectively illustrates the limited aspects of new-year’s and the ethical/moral concepts that govern it. Moral relativism, generally, sees no universal moral principles that govern all people.

New-year’s, to a Western audience, is temporally situated at the moment when December 31 becomes January 1. This does reflect on many of the cultural and ethical principles and practices of our society. New-year’s in China, and again India, for example, are different too and reflect the same principles and practices of those societies. I will use the Western new-year’s and the traditional Indian new-year’s as an example to suit my thesis of moral relativism. A Western new-year’s is only accepted if one accepts the Gregorian calendar; and likewise an Indian new-year’s is only accepted if one accepts the Indian lunar calendar, and probably religious concepts too.

So, what are the moral consequences of this? Well probably nothing if we take new-year’s explicitly as a date change. However the date change, while of explicit importance, has many implicit characteristics that are morally relevant. Let me provide some basic illustrations.

With a Western new-year’s, the concept is explicitly secular. As a matter of course there are numerous religious characteristics too but these, in a post-modern Western world, are secondary. The change of date that is a Western new-year’s supposes no new creation, no new life, no divine intervention, and no anniversary of religious (or even secular) events. These characterise the beliefs of those societies that adhere to this Western concept of new-year’s. These societies, generally, follow on from a post-Nietzsche philosophy beginning with the death of God. Moral characteristics of these societies are, generally again, based on reason, and not just ordinary reason but largely empirical reason. When Foucault ‘cut of the King’s head’ it was replaced by reason alone in these societies. So we get morality and ethical theory in these societies from reason and they (moral/ethical claims) are all, usually, reducible to reason.

Looking at the example from India we are confronted with an entirely different paradigm altogether. New-year’s in India, this year, will fall on the 3rd or 4th of March. New-year’s in Indian philosophy is governed by the moon. An Indian concept of new-year’s may be equally valid as either secular or religious; it is an empirical fact that after the set number of moons it will become a new year but the reasons behind this, the concepts, are more explicitly religious. In Indian philosophy new-year’s does suppose new creation, new life, divine intervention, and religious anniversaries; as opposed to the Western new-year’s mentioned above. We can see how morality in a country that believes in divine interaction with the world and it’s inhabitants would be different from a secular model such as the Western paradigm mentioned above. While reason has pre-eminence in Western contexts, revelation may be seen as equally important in Indian contexts.

Now as I’m trying to keep this short for an online context I’ll briefly discuss the fundamental aspect of this piece; moral relativism. From the two above mentioned examples we can, I hope, see that there are two different moral/ethical codes of interaction with the world/self. Which moral or ethical claims, therefore, should we view as true? What makes a moral/ethical claim true? Now I mentioned I would look at this from a moral relativist’s perspective and I’d first like to point out that I will not be mentioning vulgar relativism.

How I would like to peruse this issue is with, crude, reductionist theory. You see, many, if not all, of the moral and ethical claims of the two societies, while not agreeing on origin, have the same, or very similar motivations, even if other contradictory beliefs are, too, present. Treatment of dead bodies for example. Dead bodies are regarded as a form of pollution in India so are avoided. This pollution may be both material and spiritual but what we are here observing is that they (dead bodies) are viewed as polluted. Similarly, In the West dead bodies are avoided because of the bacteria present in decomposition, they are viewed then, too, as polluted. This is a crude example but an example at least.

What many modern moral relativists take from this is that there are some universal moral principles that, while not explicitly, are followed by many different societies. Many modern philosophical theories, such as utilitarianism, follow such reasoning. The job, then, of the philosopher is to ‘discover’ these primary universal moral principles and base a moral theory on those.

I do have some objections and noted limitations on moral relativism but I’ll leave those for discussion for who ever so chooses to discuss them here with me.

The Qualia Dilemma

I'm feeling a little less creative for this weeks Philosophy Blog War having been writing too many essays of late. This week I'm going to post a 'dilemma' and see if anyone can help me out with it. Remember to VOTE FOR ME.

Imagine a series of women, all called Mary, who have been afflicted from birth with a weird physiological condition—if they see colours they will die. (Maybe it is a curse.) They are given goggles that convert all colours into black-and-white images. They are given televisions and bedrooms and offices and laboratories in which everything is black-and-white, so they can take off their goggles (provided they wear black-and-white cover-alls).

Some of these women become fascinated by colour vision, precisely because they have not experienced it yet. They hope that their physiological condition will eventually be cured, and then they will see colours for themselves; but in the meantime they decide to study everything that has been written about colours. They collect and read virtually everything that has been written, not only about the science of wavelengths of light, but also about how retinas and brains respond to different patterns of stimulation from different wavelengths of light, about what poets and art critics say about colours, and so on.

Collectively, the Marys come to know everything relevant, anything that anyone could possibly tell anyone, about colours, and about what people say about colours, and about what goes on in people's brains when they think about colours, and when they experience colour vision. If one of the Marys has a ‘blind spot’, some relevant physical fact that she is somehow unable to know because it is about herself, then one of the other Marys can generally be counted on to have the knowledge, of that first Mary, which that first Mary lacks. The Marys also have helpful friends. For any scientific discovery that can be put into words (even if it is something that could only have been discovered by people with colour vision), this discovery is recorded in language, is found out by friends of the Marys, and then is communicated to them—in black and white.

Then one day, one of the Marys develops a cure for their condition. She gives herself the antidote, takes off the goggles, leaves her rooms, and sees red for the first time. Her brain undergoes various changes in response to the new stimulation, and she says, ‘Wow, so that's what it is like to see red! That is what people with colour vision have been experiencing. That is what we Marys have been missing out on.’ She tells the other Marys that the experience is great.

The other Marys have been watching their black-and-white video monitors, which have shown them exactly what went on in the first Mary's brain when she first saw red. Then the second Mary takes off her goggles and sees red, and all the remaining Marys watch their black and white screens again, to see what happens in the brain of Mary II. More or less the same thing happens in her brain as in Mary I's brain, and she too exclaims: ‘Gosh, so that's what it's like to see red!’

When we get to the nineteenth Mary, she knows almost exactly what is going to happen in her brain when she sees red for the first time. She takes off the goggles, and what happens in her brain is just what she predicted would happen. Her brain goes into a series of states almost exactly as she knew it would. The few unpredictable physical differences are definitely not ones that would cause her to say ‘Wow!’ or ‘Gosh!’

Virtually everything physical that happens, after Mary XIX takes off the goggles, is something that she already knew would happen when she took off the goggles. She gains no significant new knowledge about what physical properties are instantiated in the physical world. Yet she too, like the others before her, says, ‘Wow, so that's what it's like to see red!’—just as she expected she would. (Bigelow & Pargetter 2006, pp. 356-357).

Now these are my questions.

1. Does Mary gain 'new' knowledge?
2. What is 'new'?
3. What is the knowledge?
   
4. Since Mary already knew of all the material properties She was going to experience is the knowledge immaterial?
5. If the knowledge is 'new' and and not physical what is it?
6. Finally, how would a materialist or a non-dualist reconcile their views in light of such Qualia?
   

Of course you can just post your own thoughts into the matter as well

And

Remember to VOTE FOR ME!



References

Bigelow, J & Pargetter, R 2006, 'Re-acquaintance With Qualia', in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 84, No 3, pp. 353-378).

Hi All

Hi all.
I won't be submitting an entry for the Philosophy Blog War this week; too much Uni work to do. To keep you all interested though have a look at THIS article about an abattoir in India.....disgusting!
Also, in America this week the Frito-Lay company unveiled a new range of crisps...vege crisps. Now I thought this wasn't such a bad idea however Frito-Lay CEO Al Carey voiced his.....um....concern. He stated 'God help us all, would you look at these flavors, weren't Sun Chips healthy enough for you, you goddamn hippie bastards?' If that wasn't enough he described his company's product to his share holders as 'some shit that's made from beets'. and furthered that with 'I hope you're all happy now that you have your precious beet chips with the recommended daily serving of fruit, or vegetables, or whatever the hell a 'beet' is'. I'm sure his share holders would have left having new found confidence in their company's new product. Here's a picture of what their delivery van will probably look like for the new product.

I’m vegan and proud of it!

This is a post for the Philosophy Blog War and you can vote for me HERE.

I’m vegan and proud of it!

I haven’t always been this way though. I used to be vegetarian and before that, when I depended on my parents for my daily meals, I ate meat and eggs. I’m often asked why I’m vegan, what on earth do I eat, and how I reconcile my views with the dominant western ideology of the necessity of meat eating.

Well, the primary reason I’m vegan is moral. I certainly know that it is not universally accepted that animals are moral agents but I believe they are. I’m certain that here in Australia our Government believes they are as cruelty to animals is against our laws. Before I became vegetarian my first job was in a chicken and pig abattoir so I know first hand the degree of cruelty and blatant torture that goes on behind closed doors. I’ve witnessed chickens being scalded and plucked alive and once I saw a chicken being eviscerated alive! I know of few people who would accept such cruelty. Animals are not just things to be exploited in any way what-so-ever just so we can have cheap meat, eggs, and milk.

Most people will respond to such a moral argument by stating that because the animal industry is so ingrained in our society, my ceasing involvement in the animal industry will have no noticeable effect on animal welfare issues. Is it a valid argument to claim that people can only be morally culpable if they commit perceptible harm? To this I have to turn to Jonathan Glover and what I’ll call ‘Glover’s Problem’. ‘Glover’s Problem’ is as follows:

Glover imagines that in a village, 100 people are about to eat lunch. Each has a bowl containing 100 beans. Suddenly, 100 hungry bandits swoop down on the village. Each bandit takes the contents of the bowl of one villager, eats it, and gallops off. Next week, the bandits plan to do it again, but one of their number is afflicted by doubts about whether it is right to steal from the poor. These doubts are set to rest by another of their number who proposes that each bandit, instead of eating the entire contents of the bowl of one villager, should take one bean from every villager's bowl. Since the loss of one bean cannot make a perceptible difference to any villager, no bandit will have harmed anyone. The bandits follow this plan, each taking a solitary bean from 100 bowls. The villagers are just as hungry as they were the previous week, but the bandits can all sleep well on their full stomachs, knowing that none of them has harmed anyone (Singer 1998:67).

Each of us, even though it may not be perceptible, is responsible for the collective damage we cause.

To this one may validly state that I am just one out of the 100 bandits so 99 beans will still exist, however, in our increasingly global society one cannot know whether one is the first bandit or the 100th bandit. Even if I was the 80th bandit the villagers would still suffer. I may go into the supermarket and decide to purchase some pork chops and rationalise that I am not committing a moral offence because the pig would have died anyway and it’s likely that my not purchasing the pork chops and instead choosing TVP will cause no difference to the supermarket’s purchasing pork chops next week. This may be correct, however we will never know how many pork chops the supermarket, or pig farm pigs, need to sell to make it viable to purchase or produce more next week, and the same for TVP. Maybe I’m the deciding customer.

The meat industry is the world’s largest environmental hazard. It is the world’s largest consumer of water and the largest consumer of fossil fuels. Using just under ten kilograms of grain protein to produce one kilogram of meat protein is absurd. If we stoped feeding grain to animals used in the production of meat and instead made bread we would have enough grain to feed every person on earth with the equivalent of seven loaves of bread per day!

It takes 50 kilograms of water to produce one kilogram of wheat while it takes up to 50,000 kilograms of water to produce one kilogram of beef! Stop complaining of a drought Australia and become vegan, the whole world will be better off for it.

As for what I eat. Well being a vegan chef I find that question quite easy and I’ll even provide a simple recipe for you all to try.

Simon’s Asian Noodle Soup

• One 250 Gram packet of dried flat egg free noodles
• Five dried shitake mushrooms
• Half a cup of soy sauce
• Half a cup of mirin
• Half a handful of chopped shallots
• Two tablespoons of sugar

1. Boil the noodles until cooked, strain and rinse under cold water

2. Boil the mushrooms in half a cup of water

3. When mushrooms are softened remove from water, slice and put back in the pot with the soy sauce and mirin and cook for another five minutes

4. Add the sugar and stir well

5. Combine the cooked noodles with the sauce and sprinkle with shallots

Singer, P 1998, 'A Vegetarian Philosophy', in Griffiths, S & Wallace, J, Consuming Passions, Manchester, .pdf

Do Trees Have Rights?

I've finally gotten around to posting my first philosophy blog war entry. I hope you all enjoy and I'm sincerely looking forward to your comments. To vote for my post click here

Do trees have rights? Do other in-animate ‘life’ forms have rights? These questions are too often over looked by predominantly ‘western’[1] post Socratic philosophers and scientists often unjustifiably and without any reason other than heritage. Ethics and Moral ‘codes’ are fashioned around a human-centric view of the cosmos and extend only so far as to include other conscious creatures that have a relative similarity with us. Arbor (1986, p336) illustrates the key foundation of ‘western’ ethics as:

[o]nly the conscious states and interests of sentient being[s] can be valuable in themselves. Other things are valuable only in so far as they bring about desired conscious states or promote these interests.

This statement assumes that one can do whatever one desires to anything that is not classified as a ‘sentient’ being as long as it causes no direct or indirect harm to the interests of other sentient beings. Is this an ethical position to hold? Can I go out and mutilate any non-sentient being I desire? Well, it depends on who I am and how I identify myself with my world.

In Japan there is a long tradition of an art known as Bonsai. Arbor (1986, p336) uses this as an example to argue that mutilating a tree is ethically wrong. He presents a conditional proposition that gave rise to Bonsai; if trees are deformed by natural forces then trees can be deformed by un-natural forces. Arbor then presents an analogous argument stating that if trees are deformed by natural forces and it’s okay to extend that to deforming trees by un-natural forces then it follows that if humans are deformed by natural forces (birth defects, genetic illnesses etc.) then it should likewise be okay to deform humans by un-natural forces. This would be opposed by most and this opposition would rightly sit with the above mentioned definition of ethics. Does this make it right though? There is an air of a bourgeoisie, colonial, or even chauvinistic character in this definition. Let us look at another example.

There is much dispute over whether it is ethically correct to expose certain animals, such as apes, to laboratory tests for the benefit of humans. The most fundamental ethical claim put forward by those conducting these tests is that the creatures, while certainly being sentient, have no conception, or at least a very limited conception, of their future well being. They live in the here and now and that causing suffering to them is not upsetting the definition given above because their interests are not being inhibited. Remember, the claim is that they have a limited conception or none at all of their future so they therefore have no self interest. Can we extend this claim then to other sentient beings such as humans? When a human child is born it cannot identify itself with this world nor have an interest in its future. It can be argued, however, that the child will develop these characteristics with age. Sometimes, however, humans are born with, or develop, mental disorders where they cannot identify with their surroundings or with themselves and they have no conception of their interests or their future. Can, in this instance, humans be subjected to the sort of treatment that laboratory animals endure? Most people will argue that no matter what, humans cannot be tortured or undergo laboratory tests such as grafting an ear of another species on her back. Some will even state that euthanasia is ethically wrong in such a case. What is the basis for such an argument? Treating these humans in this way would certainly fit with the definition of ethics given above but most still object. This is obviously a case of 'humanism', stating that being human is the characteristic that provides us our ethical liberties and not something that makes us human.

How does this example of comparing lab animals with humans of similar mental capacities, whether right or wrong, relate to whether trees have rights you may ask? Well, the fact that trees seem to be outside the scope of ‘western’ ethics is an ideological distinction. The fact that the ethics we have in ‘western’ society derives from a post Socratic weltanschauung, by definition, cannot be thought of as universally relevant. Because some may think, according to their ideological heritage, that trees have no rights does not mean that all people think that trees have no rights. In traditional Indigenous Australian philosophy even rocks and other inanimate objects have rights; traditional Indigenous Australians act ‘ethically’ towards such objects. What makes someone human, makes them alive, makes them ethically valuable, is the same as what makes a tree a tree or a rock a rock; some inanimate objects and places are even considered more important than humans. I can just imagine a ‘western’ scientist saying we can torture humans but we mustn’t even look at that rock. What seems absurd to us may be undeniably true to others.

Do trees have rights? I think so. But my reason for this position is that my ideological position is different from the generic ‘western’ model presented above. It is the dominant ‘western’ scientific ideology that reduces ethical nature, the nature of life, to sentience, to consciousness. I believe that there is a uniting force, an anima if you will, that is common in all life; in humans, in animals, and in trees. The ethical rights I give myself and to other humans I extend to all that shares what I share. If you declare that the definition of ethics given above is what you believe then that is fine, however, please remember the heritage of that position and the validity of other ethical view points as well. After all, ‘western’ thought, including science, can be argued to be just another social construction.

References

Arbor, JL 1986, ‘Animal Chauvinism, Plant-Regarding Ethics and the Torture of Trees’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 335-339.

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[1] I’m not overly happy with the term ‘western’, I may have used ‘northern’ or something similar to describe the ideological system adhered to by the group in question, however, ‘western’ remains the most widely understood term in classifying this ideological system.

Philosophy Blog War

Just a quick note to all those philosophy blog warriors out there, I will post an entry but not untill I've completed my assessment. I have a History paper due on Wednesday and then a Religion and a Philosophy paper due on Friday. If i get all these done on time I'll post on Saturday, if I don't get these done on time I'll post when ever I get the chance.