Orientalism in Australia: the Middle Eastern Mongrel

This morning I was enjoying myself at one of our local markets when my wife and I overheard some fellow market goers talking about a shopkeepers dog. Being the eavesdroppers that we are, my wife and I adamantly listened in. This group, the fellow market goers (I'll call them a group, I assume that's an appropriate collective noun for market patrons), some middle aged to elderly ladies, were discussing 'what was in the dog'. By this they were attempting to discern what 'breeds' of dog were present in this apparent mongrel. As an aside, the dog in question was a very healthy and happy looking creature.

My wife and I were unable to listen in to the entire conversation as the group moved along but this got us talking. My wife is a Sociology/Community Development major so she's quite interested in a lot of the same concepts as I. We were both of the same opinion that this was a case of 'othering' or 'orientalism'. I put it this way: The group attempted to put the dog into a 'class', in a sense labeling the dog. This then allows them to discuss the value of the dog in relation to other designated 'classes', maybe in relation to the 'class' we would call 'purebred'. From this division of 'classes' and value distinctions we are left with a social system created entirely by the observer.

It is easy to observe a correlate 'racialisation' in the contemporary world, particularly Australia at present. We (I use this term loosely) assign characteristics to this 'other' no matter how diverse they may possibly be. I'll use the example of the Middle East here as it is particularly relevant. Middle Eastern people have been racialised in Australia in a very similar way to mongrel dogs. Despite their diverse social systems, religions, and ethnicities, they are lumped in to a socially constructed mongrel class. As Scott Poynting, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar and Jock Collins show in their recent book Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other (2004, p.49), 'Middle Eastern [has] become conflated with Arab, Arab with Muslim, Muslim with rapist, rapist with gang, gang with terrorist, terrorist with 'boat people', 'boat people' with barbaric, and so on...'. Now while all of these characteristics may not be applied to all Middle Eastern people all of the time most of them are. It is an interesting exercise to ask people on the street to define the Middle East. Most people point to a geographical area on a map, most of these people, however, disagree where the boundaries are. It is interesting, or perhaps sad, to see this though; many people will include India in their Middle East map and many Australians, and I can only assume people of other nationalities too, are loath to include Israel, although most do if they are pointing to a map that isn't labeled. You see Israel is geographically part of the Middle East but is ethnically separate, or so they say...(Maybe more on this another time)

But the entire Middle East is a diverse area. There have been, and continue to be, numerous religions present and the diverse social systems can be quite contrasting. Even throwing the label Muslim around is part of the same problem, mongreling this Middle Eastern other. The Middle East is a 'Western' Orientalist experiment gone wrong; because the diversity was never recognised, even to this day, the Middle East is simply a mongrel.

Like the mongrel dog at the market today, the Middle East and the many and diverse people who reside there, and the many and diverse people who reside here in Australia, Australian citizens...people born here, people with Middle Eastern heritage, will never be fully valued. By making this statement I am in no way claiming that people who are from the Middle East, or who's ancestors were/are, are in any way to be thought of as a dog, I am simply saying that Australian society treats them that way, as a mongrel. We have created a single class of people from a diverse social group and assigned them characteristics that many of them have never possessed. Australia created the Middle Eastern other in our national psyche, it is not an organic feature of the world. Australia has created the Middle Eastern Mongrel.

Richard Rorty

As most of us are now aware, Richard Rorty, the eminent American philosopher and Professor of comparative literature at Stanford University, died this week (June 8). I'm not going to write anything here as whatever I could, or perhaps could not, write just couldn't do the man justice. What I will direct the reader to, however, is the fantastic program The Philosopher's Zone that this week dedicated an entire episode to Rorty. The presenter, Alan Saunders, and Paul Redding, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, discuss Rorty's life and works. The entire transcript is now available and for the next four weeks the audio is available to either listen to live or download. LINK.

Exams

I just got my results for my mid-term test for PHI220: Body & Mind and, to my delight, I received 100%. The test was simple and consisted of five questions in multiple choice and short answer which I'll post below with my answers.

Q.1.

Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that:

A) Mental properties are causally inert
B) We don't have privileged access to our own mental states
C) Mental states are neither material nor immaterial
D) It is a category mistake to think that 'the mind' refers to a substance
E) All mental states are phenomenal states

Q.2.

J.J.C. Smart advances the identity theory, according to which sensations are brain processes, as:

A) an a priori claim whose truth can be established by an analysis of mental concepts
B) a claim that we can see must be true even if we have no idea how it can be true
C) a claim that must be true because its denial-dualism-is unintelligible
D) an empirical speculation that has little chance of being true
E) a plausible empirical claim

Q.3.

Explain why Putnam discusses the mental life of other animals-such as the octopus-in arguing against the claim that mental states are brain states.

Putnam argues that the brain-state theorist, to make good his claims, needs to specify a physical-chemical state so that any organism is in pain, necessarily and sufficiently, if it possess a brain of a suitable physical-chemical composition and its brain is actually in that physical-chemical state. This is not limited to just mammalian brains but any organism that has the potential to experience pain which, while sufficiently including mammals, also includes reptiles and molluscs (octopus), for example, as well. Putnam uses this example to illustrate the ambitiousness of the brain-state hypothesis claiming that the brain-state theorist does not just claim that pain is a brain state but that all psychological states are brain states. Putnam claims that if we can find a single psychological state that can be applied to both a mammal and an octopus, for example, and that the physical-chemical correlate is different between the two then brain-state theory collapses. Putnam thinks that this is 'overwhelmingly probable'.

Q.4.

Explain in a few sentences how the functionalist account of mental states differs from the behaviorist account of mental states.

Ned Block describes Functionalism as 'a new incarnation of behaviorism' because while there are many similarities between Functionalism and Behaviorism there is a difference in their ascription of mental states. For Behaviorism to be met a mental state consists of a disposition to act in certain ways relative to a certain set of input-output relationships, however Functionalism goes further. Functionalism also requires that internal (mental) processes will have a causal relationship with other internal (mental) processes and, at the same time, have a causal relationship with external input-output relationships. Functionalism therefore claims that mental states may be seen as causal 'objects' while Behaviorism only sees sensory inputs, or external causes (input-output relationships), as causally significant.

Q.5.

Block uses the example of the homunculi-headed robots to argue that functionalism is wrong because it:

A) is too liberal in its ascription of mental states
B) has no plausible account of mental causation
C) reduces to behaviorism
D) cannot give a plausible account of privileged access
E) is consistent with dualism

MQPhil Group Philosophy Blog

I really enjoy reading the many and fantastic group philosophy blogs on the net and now there is another one that you should all check out. MQPhil is a group philosophy blog by undergraduates from Macquarie University Australia. Looks like there will be some interesting entries soon.

<--LINK-->

Philosophy, Morality & Society - Major essay - Pt. 2

Another semester down, phew. For whatever reason, well actually many reasons, I was just overwhelmed this semester. It's not that the work was too hard or anything similar I think that it has more to do with the fact that I've not had more than a single weekend off for over a year. My plan to remedy this: an international holiday. That's right, I'm off to India in a few weeks. I thought that unless I just make a booking I'll never give myself a break so that's what I did.

I got my final essay in today. I had quite a bit of trouble reducing that argument to so few words. There is just so much more information I wanted to include but I had to leave it out. If anyone wants to read my essay you can find it HERE or browse through some of my others by clicking |uni papers| above.

This semester I'm studying three subjects: An Introduction to Buddhism - Body & Mind - Business & Professional Ethics. I'm looking forward to all three but I am perhaps more eager to get back into the religious studies subject and the Body & Mind subject looks quite good too. Having said that I'll probably end up enjoying Business & Professional Ethics more :)

Now to get back to the Buddhism lectures.

Philosophy, Morality & Society - Major essay

I'm having one hell of a time writing this last essay for Philosophy, Morality & Society and it is not just the crappy word count. Well, the word count is pretty limiting; with only 1500 words I'm not sure how anyone can do justice to any question! My essay question is to describe how Professor Peter Singer argues that the interests of animals should be given equal consideration with the interests of Human beings and to outline whether I think that there is a moral divide between human and non-human animals. I think that there isn't any morally significant difference but how am I supposed to answer this question in only 1500 words!

Secondly, I received a telephone call from Centerlink, Australia's state welfare agency, the other day and I was advised that I am being cut off my meager pension. The reason, basically, is because of a loophole. I'm on disability pension (DSP) and, it seems, that to be eligible for DSP the candidate doesn't only need a debilitating medical condition but that condition needs to be being currently treated and stabalised.

Now this seems adequate on the surface but in my case I seem to slip through the cracks. Let me explain. I have a debilitating back condition. I usually describe it as a broken back but no vertebrae are in fact damaged. I have a perforated disk. The fluid in this disk has since drained out and I've been left with a mass of scar tissue surrounding the disk. The problem with this is that the disk itself has no nerves, and for good reason. If the disk had nerves every time you moved you would aggravate those nerves as each vertebrae slid around. Scar tissue has nerves so every time I move my spine I get quite severe pain. Surgery is out as the disks above and below are showing signs of weakness and were surgery to be performed the pressure on these disks would increase exponentially and hence increase the risk of them deteriorating further.

Now, on the surface, this would seem like a pretty good case for DSP but this is where the loophole comes into question. The criteria states that the condition needs to be stabalised and being currently treated. I've had masses of treatment and the outcome was, basically, that there is nothing that can be done other than some physio to slightly increase my mobility. Since then I have received no treatment, because none is available, and my condition isn't stabalised, it's in fact getting worse, because of there being no treatment available.

So because there is no treatment available for this condition I am not entitled to DSP. Now this seems absolutely absurd to me. My only option is to seek out the same, expensive, treatment that I've already had so I can reapply for DSP. It seems absolutely absurd that people with treatable conditions are eligible for DSP but people with medical conditions of which there is no available treatment are not entitled to DSP. In my opinion I think that this should be reversed if anything. What a way to clog up our health system; have possibly thousands of people with un-treatable medical conditions receive treatment that will do nothing just so they can get the pension that they need because they have limited-to-no access to work.

So this is my dilemma this week. I have this essay to complete but I'm also battling state bureaucracy and back to receiving daily treatment that I not only don't need but have to take time out of studying to travel to.

Bloody Centerlink. Your admin really need to go and read some Rawls.

Second Philosophy Essay

I received the comments back for my second essay this semester and I would have to say that I'm in complete agreement with them. Usually I'd disagree and pick the markers comments apart but this time I'm fine with them. I knew I wasn't perfect...this time.

You see, I'm having trouble answering the essay questions with such a tiny word limit - 1500 words. The question for this last essay was 'What are the central claims of moral relativism? Is moral relativism a plausible meta-ethical theory? Answer with reference to both objections to the theory and defences of it'. To me, at least, I had no idea how to answer this question, coherently and justly, in only 1500 words; and this seemed to be the only criticism of my essay, in essence.

I have two sets of comments for this essay, the first set from the guy who marked it and the second from my tutor. Both were almost identical. My arguments were clear, my exmples were unique and interesting, and the essay shows 'shows abundant research, passion, and understanding'.

The negative criticisms were uniform too and basically said that I was too ambitious and tried to cover too much ground with too few words; and I totally agree - I am ambitious!

Now, at least, I know where I need to focus for the next essay.

A Morally Relative New-Year's

Well, it's been a while since I've posted on here. Being busy with holidays and summer school, southern hemisphere remember. I hope you enjoy my philosophical take on new-year's. And do remember to VOTE FOR ME!

Writing a Philosophy entry that has a new-year’s theme really got me thinking. I was really quite stumped as to how this time of year, or the concept of this time of year, had much to do with philosophy at all. What I have chosen to write about I stumbled across while reading my course material for a subject I’m currently undertaking at University. This has little to do with the ‘stuff’ of new-year’s but much to do with the concept, I suppose. What I am going to be discussing is meta-ethical moral relativism. I don’t particularly agree with all of the premises of moral relativism but I will use it, here, to illustrate the new-year’s concept.

It may be put, and validly so, that morality, or more specifically moral relativism, has little to do with the concept of new-year’s. I’m sure there will be little debate that moral theory could be applied to the happenings of new-year’s though. I am sticking with moral relativism, though, because it effectively illustrates the limited aspects of new-year’s and the ethical/moral concepts that govern it. Moral relativism, generally, sees no universal moral principles that govern all people.

New-year’s, to a Western audience, is temporally situated at the moment when December 31 becomes January 1. This does reflect on many of the cultural and ethical principles and practices of our society. New-year’s in China, and again India, for example, are different too and reflect the same principles and practices of those societies. I will use the Western new-year’s and the traditional Indian new-year’s as an example to suit my thesis of moral relativism. A Western new-year’s is only accepted if one accepts the Gregorian calendar; and likewise an Indian new-year’s is only accepted if one accepts the Indian lunar calendar, and probably religious concepts too.

So, what are the moral consequences of this? Well probably nothing if we take new-year’s explicitly as a date change. However the date change, while of explicit importance, has many implicit characteristics that are morally relevant. Let me provide some basic illustrations.

With a Western new-year’s, the concept is explicitly secular. As a matter of course there are numerous religious characteristics too but these, in a post-modern Western world, are secondary. The change of date that is a Western new-year’s supposes no new creation, no new life, no divine intervention, and no anniversary of religious (or even secular) events. These characterise the beliefs of those societies that adhere to this Western concept of new-year’s. These societies, generally, follow on from a post-Nietzsche philosophy beginning with the death of God. Moral characteristics of these societies are, generally again, based on reason, and not just ordinary reason but largely empirical reason. When Foucault ‘cut of the King’s head’ it was replaced by reason alone in these societies. So we get morality and ethical theory in these societies from reason and they (moral/ethical claims) are all, usually, reducible to reason.

Looking at the example from India we are confronted with an entirely different paradigm altogether. New-year’s in India, this year, will fall on the 3rd or 4th of March. New-year’s in Indian philosophy is governed by the moon. An Indian concept of new-year’s may be equally valid as either secular or religious; it is an empirical fact that after the set number of moons it will become a new year but the reasons behind this, the concepts, are more explicitly religious. In Indian philosophy new-year’s does suppose new creation, new life, divine intervention, and religious anniversaries; as opposed to the Western new-year’s mentioned above. We can see how morality in a country that believes in divine interaction with the world and it’s inhabitants would be different from a secular model such as the Western paradigm mentioned above. While reason has pre-eminence in Western contexts, revelation may be seen as equally important in Indian contexts.

Now as I’m trying to keep this short for an online context I’ll briefly discuss the fundamental aspect of this piece; moral relativism. From the two above mentioned examples we can, I hope, see that there are two different moral/ethical codes of interaction with the world/self. Which moral or ethical claims, therefore, should we view as true? What makes a moral/ethical claim true? Now I mentioned I would look at this from a moral relativist’s perspective and I’d first like to point out that I will not be mentioning vulgar relativism.

How I would like to peruse this issue is with, crude, reductionist theory. You see, many, if not all, of the moral and ethical claims of the two societies, while not agreeing on origin, have the same, or very similar motivations, even if other contradictory beliefs are, too, present. Treatment of dead bodies for example. Dead bodies are regarded as a form of pollution in India so are avoided. This pollution may be both material and spiritual but what we are here observing is that they (dead bodies) are viewed as polluted. Similarly, In the West dead bodies are avoided because of the bacteria present in decomposition, they are viewed then, too, as polluted. This is a crude example but an example at least.

What many modern moral relativists take from this is that there are some universal moral principles that, while not explicitly, are followed by many different societies. Many modern philosophical theories, such as utilitarianism, follow such reasoning. The job, then, of the philosopher is to ‘discover’ these primary universal moral principles and base a moral theory on those.

I do have some objections and noted limitations on moral relativism but I’ll leave those for discussion for who ever so chooses to discuss them here with me.

Pronoun Absurdity

I have problems with comma placement. Most of the time it's due to not proof reading my work, other times it's due to my lack of grammatical training. What I have noticed this week, however, is how many people have problems with pronouns. This week I had a piece of assessment due for a philosophy subject I'm studying and I had the opportunity to view some other students work. I have read 14 pieces of assessment so far. While on the most part these essays were of a good quality there was a general problem, that being the use of pronouns.

I think this problem is due to the response to a particular students question relating to the use of the personal pronoun I. You see, my tutor advised against using this (another grammatical quirk I've noticed recently is the use of said or former as pronouns to refer to a previous subject, not strictly 'wrong', I know, but still not necessary especially when the reader will need to read previous sections of text to gather the meaning again) pronoun so the essay would remain neutral. While there's little wrong in many circumstances with avoiding personal pronouns in academic writing the directive of the tutor seems to have shocked many students into absurd pronoun usage.

You see there is a general rule governing the usage of pronouns and this rule states (Do you like my use of states? This is not grammatically correct either. rule is an inanimate object. I should perhaps have said - this rule of which is stated, but I'm not that idiomatic), a pronoun requires a true antecedent. Nearly every essay I read used it without an antecedent, which in itself may not be wrong but it is subjectively governed. For example, if I say "Epicurus offered to theorise but it was not accepted" then it is not governed by a true antecedent. I would need to say "Epicurus offered his theory but it was not accepted". Maybe I'm being to idiomatic here but ambiguity is the worst enemy of academic writing.

Another common mistake that I've noticed focuses on the use of he. There is also nothing wrong with using the word he but this pronoun, whether he, him, his, refers to the subject of the sentence. Notice I've used the word sentence here as this is important. You cannot use the pronoun he etc. in a sentence if the subject is yet to be identified in the sentence or if there is more than one applicable subject. I cannot say "Epicurus is a classist. He is, therefore, evil" because the he is not adequately governed. It makes sense audibly but not when read. I could write "Epicurus is a classist and he is, therefore, evil". I should probably even write "Epicurus is a classist so he is evil". I cannot, also, say "Locke describes Epicurus as a hedonist so he is, therefore, evil". The he in this sentence doe's in fact govern Epicurus but it is ambiguous. I may have been attempting to slander Locke. English is, as far as my knowledge extends, the only language that is ambiguous with he type pronouns. Latin has two he type pronouns with only one being subjective and my other language, Hindi, has three or perhaps more he type pronouns.

Antecedents to pronouns are necessary and do keep them in mind. There may be cases where you can place the antecedent after (I know it sounds absurd placing an antecedent after a pronoun) the pronoun but these are extremely limited. Look at this statement, "If the baby does not thrive on raw milk, boil it". It is here plain to see for all.

I won't go on and mention all the pronoun errors. I've likely made many myself. I know I've placed many commas in incorrect locations in previous works so I'm not the best person to comment on grammar. I just received an essay back today and while I did receive a HD I have found seven misplaced commas. One of these misplaced commas changes the meaning of the sentence drastically but my tutor either didn't notice or agreed with the alternate meaning. I won't comment on my essay that I've just submitted because my tutor may read this and....well you get the picture.

Open Philosophy Forum

I've just enrolled in a philosophy course over summer as it is a prerequisite for some other philosophy subjects I'm doing next year. What's interesting is that there are quite a few students who've previously completed other philosophy subjects and the online discussion was, therefore, getting a bit too much for the first year students. Oh yeah, did I mention I study externally? Well, to address this problem the course co-ordinator has set up a forum so we can debate the course content, and anything else philosophy related, as much as we desire as this is a voluntary forum. Best thing though, it's open to all. Come on over and have a look and join up and post a message. The forum is called Open Philosophy and you can find it HERE

Kazakhstan Human Rights Abuses

I thought it was about time I pasted this on my blog. Some Vaisnava devotees in Kazakhstan have been being persucuted solely because of their religious affiliation for many years. We never seriously thought it would go this far with numerous Human Rights orginisations observing and wide spread condemnation from Europen Governments such as the British and the French.

On November 21, however, the Kazakhstan Government decided that they would 'take back' the land that these devotees have established a farm on. What's worse is that the houses were demolished while people, predominantley women and children, were still inside. All media and Human Rights observers were banned from the area and were threatened with force and violence if they did not comply. All photographic material was confiscated.

During this 'procedure' there were no officials present which is required under Kazakhstan law and no one is willing to take responsibility for the actions. Not a single police officer or demolition worker would wear their name tag or identify themselves either. The leader of the operation, the Hakim, even said to one of the Human Rights observers

'If I see you here again, I will personally crush Your eyes, even though I am the Hakim.'

I'm going to post the few videos that are available in my humble attampt to make this issue more widely known.

This is part of the demolition and police response.

There's still more if you care to look. Click HERE to see.

The Qualia Dilemma

I'm feeling a little less creative for this weeks Philosophy Blog War having been writing too many essays of late. This week I'm going to post a 'dilemma' and see if anyone can help me out with it. Remember to VOTE FOR ME.

Imagine a series of women, all called Mary, who have been afflicted from birth with a weird physiological condition—if they see colours they will die. (Maybe it is a curse.) They are given goggles that convert all colours into black-and-white images. They are given televisions and bedrooms and offices and laboratories in which everything is black-and-white, so they can take off their goggles (provided they wear black-and-white cover-alls).

Some of these women become fascinated by colour vision, precisely because they have not experienced it yet. They hope that their physiological condition will eventually be cured, and then they will see colours for themselves; but in the meantime they decide to study everything that has been written about colours. They collect and read virtually everything that has been written, not only about the science of wavelengths of light, but also about how retinas and brains respond to different patterns of stimulation from different wavelengths of light, about what poets and art critics say about colours, and so on.

Collectively, the Marys come to know everything relevant, anything that anyone could possibly tell anyone, about colours, and about what people say about colours, and about what goes on in people's brains when they think about colours, and when they experience colour vision. If one of the Marys has a ‘blind spot’, some relevant physical fact that she is somehow unable to know because it is about herself, then one of the other Marys can generally be counted on to have the knowledge, of that first Mary, which that first Mary lacks. The Marys also have helpful friends. For any scientific discovery that can be put into words (even if it is something that could only have been discovered by people with colour vision), this discovery is recorded in language, is found out by friends of the Marys, and then is communicated to them—in black and white.

Then one day, one of the Marys develops a cure for their condition. She gives herself the antidote, takes off the goggles, leaves her rooms, and sees red for the first time. Her brain undergoes various changes in response to the new stimulation, and she says, ‘Wow, so that's what it is like to see red! That is what people with colour vision have been experiencing. That is what we Marys have been missing out on.’ She tells the other Marys that the experience is great.

The other Marys have been watching their black-and-white video monitors, which have shown them exactly what went on in the first Mary's brain when she first saw red. Then the second Mary takes off her goggles and sees red, and all the remaining Marys watch their black and white screens again, to see what happens in the brain of Mary II. More or less the same thing happens in her brain as in Mary I's brain, and she too exclaims: ‘Gosh, so that's what it's like to see red!’

When we get to the nineteenth Mary, she knows almost exactly what is going to happen in her brain when she sees red for the first time. She takes off the goggles, and what happens in her brain is just what she predicted would happen. Her brain goes into a series of states almost exactly as she knew it would. The few unpredictable physical differences are definitely not ones that would cause her to say ‘Wow!’ or ‘Gosh!’

Virtually everything physical that happens, after Mary XIX takes off the goggles, is something that she already knew would happen when she took off the goggles. She gains no significant new knowledge about what physical properties are instantiated in the physical world. Yet she too, like the others before her, says, ‘Wow, so that's what it's like to see red!’—just as she expected she would. (Bigelow & Pargetter 2006, pp. 356-357).

Now these are my questions.

1. Does Mary gain 'new' knowledge?
2. What is 'new'?
3. What is the knowledge?
   
4. Since Mary already knew of all the material properties She was going to experience is the knowledge immaterial?
5. If the knowledge is 'new' and and not physical what is it?
6. Finally, how would a materialist or a non-dualist reconcile their views in light of such Qualia?
   

Of course you can just post your own thoughts into the matter as well

And

Remember to VOTE FOR ME!



References

Bigelow, J & Pargetter, R 2006, 'Re-acquaintance With Qualia', in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 84, No 3, pp. 353-378).

Fast Food Nation

I'm a fan of the book Fast Food Nation and while I live in Australia and our farming and processing practices are slightly different I just had to post this LINK for any Americans who may be reading.

Hi All

Hi all.
I won't be submitting an entry for the Philosophy Blog War this week; too much Uni work to do. To keep you all interested though have a look at THIS article about an abattoir in India.....disgusting!
Also, in America this week the Frito-Lay company unveiled a new range of crisps...vege crisps. Now I thought this wasn't such a bad idea however Frito-Lay CEO Al Carey voiced his.....um....concern. He stated 'God help us all, would you look at these flavors, weren't Sun Chips healthy enough for you, you goddamn hippie bastards?' If that wasn't enough he described his company's product to his share holders as 'some shit that's made from beets'. and furthered that with 'I hope you're all happy now that you have your precious beet chips with the recommended daily serving of fruit, or vegetables, or whatever the hell a 'beet' is'. I'm sure his share holders would have left having new found confidence in their company's new product. Here's a picture of what their delivery van will probably look like for the new product.

To Pork or Not To Pork

I was really looking forward to seeing some adds appear this week in particular Australian magazines such as Marie Claire, Good Weekend, and Delicious about the Australian Pork Industry. Two magazines, The Australian Women's Weekly and Women's Day, have pledged to continue with the adds however. The adds are a unique attempt to illustrate the cruelty of the Australian Pork industry.

I’m vegan and proud of it!

This is a post for the Philosophy Blog War and you can vote for me HERE.

I’m vegan and proud of it!

I haven’t always been this way though. I used to be vegetarian and before that, when I depended on my parents for my daily meals, I ate meat and eggs. I’m often asked why I’m vegan, what on earth do I eat, and how I reconcile my views with the dominant western ideology of the necessity of meat eating.

Well, the primary reason I’m vegan is moral. I certainly know that it is not universally accepted that animals are moral agents but I believe they are. I’m certain that here in Australia our Government believes they are as cruelty to animals is against our laws. Before I became vegetarian my first job was in a chicken and pig abattoir so I know first hand the degree of cruelty and blatant torture that goes on behind closed doors. I’ve witnessed chickens being scalded and plucked alive and once I saw a chicken being eviscerated alive! I know of few people who would accept such cruelty. Animals are not just things to be exploited in any way what-so-ever just so we can have cheap meat, eggs, and milk.

Most people will respond to such a moral argument by stating that because the animal industry is so ingrained in our society, my ceasing involvement in the animal industry will have no noticeable effect on animal welfare issues. Is it a valid argument to claim that people can only be morally culpable if they commit perceptible harm? To this I have to turn to Jonathan Glover and what I’ll call ‘Glover’s Problem’. ‘Glover’s Problem’ is as follows:

Glover imagines that in a village, 100 people are about to eat lunch. Each has a bowl containing 100 beans. Suddenly, 100 hungry bandits swoop down on the village. Each bandit takes the contents of the bowl of one villager, eats it, and gallops off. Next week, the bandits plan to do it again, but one of their number is afflicted by doubts about whether it is right to steal from the poor. These doubts are set to rest by another of their number who proposes that each bandit, instead of eating the entire contents of the bowl of one villager, should take one bean from every villager's bowl. Since the loss of one bean cannot make a perceptible difference to any villager, no bandit will have harmed anyone. The bandits follow this plan, each taking a solitary bean from 100 bowls. The villagers are just as hungry as they were the previous week, but the bandits can all sleep well on their full stomachs, knowing that none of them has harmed anyone (Singer 1998:67).

Each of us, even though it may not be perceptible, is responsible for the collective damage we cause.

To this one may validly state that I am just one out of the 100 bandits so 99 beans will still exist, however, in our increasingly global society one cannot know whether one is the first bandit or the 100th bandit. Even if I was the 80th bandit the villagers would still suffer. I may go into the supermarket and decide to purchase some pork chops and rationalise that I am not committing a moral offence because the pig would have died anyway and it’s likely that my not purchasing the pork chops and instead choosing TVP will cause no difference to the supermarket’s purchasing pork chops next week. This may be correct, however we will never know how many pork chops the supermarket, or pig farm pigs, need to sell to make it viable to purchase or produce more next week, and the same for TVP. Maybe I’m the deciding customer.

The meat industry is the world’s largest environmental hazard. It is the world’s largest consumer of water and the largest consumer of fossil fuels. Using just under ten kilograms of grain protein to produce one kilogram of meat protein is absurd. If we stoped feeding grain to animals used in the production of meat and instead made bread we would have enough grain to feed every person on earth with the equivalent of seven loaves of bread per day!

It takes 50 kilograms of water to produce one kilogram of wheat while it takes up to 50,000 kilograms of water to produce one kilogram of beef! Stop complaining of a drought Australia and become vegan, the whole world will be better off for it.

As for what I eat. Well being a vegan chef I find that question quite easy and I’ll even provide a simple recipe for you all to try.

Simon’s Asian Noodle Soup

• One 250 Gram packet of dried flat egg free noodles
• Five dried shitake mushrooms
• Half a cup of soy sauce
• Half a cup of mirin
• Half a handful of chopped shallots
• Two tablespoons of sugar

1. Boil the noodles until cooked, strain and rinse under cold water

2. Boil the mushrooms in half a cup of water

3. When mushrooms are softened remove from water, slice and put back in the pot with the soy sauce and mirin and cook for another five minutes

4. Add the sugar and stir well

5. Combine the cooked noodles with the sauce and sprinkle with shallots

Singer, P 1998, 'A Vegetarian Philosophy', in Griffiths, S & Wallace, J, Consuming Passions, Manchester, .pdf

We're Not Happy John!

You see, Australia is one of the countries that supports the Iraq war and I'm not ashamed to say that this is one of the reasons why I opted for dual citizenship when I became an Aussie. Our Prime Minister, John Howard, has long declared that we will leave Iraq when our 'job is done'.

Apparently, we went to Iraq to dispose of Saddam 'cause the blighter was creating a stockpile of nuclear and biological weapons to use against us. I know, isn't that a great word, us, just who is that exactly? I love Little John's alterity.

This morning, after the opposition Labor party hounded the little guy for over a week, John Howard has come out of his closet, or should we say 'walk in robe'? It'd have to be pretty large to keep all of those euphemisms and blatant lies in there! Anyhow, it would appear our job description has changed. Little John has said Australia will leave Iraq when democracy has been established. Was this our original objective? It would seem likely as there were no chemical or nuclear weapons found in Iraq.

Our Little John, it seems, has become a neo-colonialist who's aim is to take over other Nation States that the original colonialists failed in creating. Most people argue these days that Iraq was a strategic move to control oil. Maybe it was, maybe it wasn't, I just don't know.

What I am now certain of is that John Howard has become, always was, an ideologue. He seems convinced of the ideology of the Nation State and maintaining the Nation State, even when the Nation States in question were created by colonialists and not the citizens (a very democratic procedure indeed!).

Little John is definitely an ideologue when it comes to neo-liberal democracy. His 'coming out of the walk in robe' statement this morning shows him for all that he is. Little John wants to establish democracy in Iraq, undemocratically, for the sole purpose of getting what he, and the other neo-colonialists George Bush, Tony Blair etc. want.

Little John, stop harassing us University students for being ideologues when we mention Marx or apply the theory of orientalism to contemporary society. You are an ideologue yourself and what's worse is that your ideological actions are destroying the lives of thousands and your influence, however unfounded, is influencing millions of people who know no better.

Wake up little John! We all know your political career is drawing to an end so out with it. Come out of the closet John and let Australia know who you really are! I promise we wont treat you like Fraser.

How many dead cows does it take to save a dog?

Yesterday while visiting my local IGA supermarket there was a group of 'animal welfare' people rallying up support for a campaign to stop cruelty to dogs. The group in question are called paws. Now I'm not against animal welfare at all but these guys were raising money by having a sausage sizzle. What I fail to understand is why they see it as okay to mistreat cows, slaughter them, process them, and then capitalise off of their sale and in the same breath see it as not okay to mistreat dogs? I'm sure that those sausages weren't made of dog meat!

On a different note, I'm slipping in votes in this round of the Philosophy Blog War. Please take the couple of seconds to vote for me by clicking here. Much appreciated.

Do Trees Have Rights?

I've finally gotten around to posting my first philosophy blog war entry. I hope you all enjoy and I'm sincerely looking forward to your comments. To vote for my post click here

Do trees have rights? Do other in-animate ‘life’ forms have rights? These questions are too often over looked by predominantly ‘western’[1] post Socratic philosophers and scientists often unjustifiably and without any reason other than heritage. Ethics and Moral ‘codes’ are fashioned around a human-centric view of the cosmos and extend only so far as to include other conscious creatures that have a relative similarity with us. Arbor (1986, p336) illustrates the key foundation of ‘western’ ethics as:

[o]nly the conscious states and interests of sentient being[s] can be valuable in themselves. Other things are valuable only in so far as they bring about desired conscious states or promote these interests.

This statement assumes that one can do whatever one desires to anything that is not classified as a ‘sentient’ being as long as it causes no direct or indirect harm to the interests of other sentient beings. Is this an ethical position to hold? Can I go out and mutilate any non-sentient being I desire? Well, it depends on who I am and how I identify myself with my world.

In Japan there is a long tradition of an art known as Bonsai. Arbor (1986, p336) uses this as an example to argue that mutilating a tree is ethically wrong. He presents a conditional proposition that gave rise to Bonsai; if trees are deformed by natural forces then trees can be deformed by un-natural forces. Arbor then presents an analogous argument stating that if trees are deformed by natural forces and it’s okay to extend that to deforming trees by un-natural forces then it follows that if humans are deformed by natural forces (birth defects, genetic illnesses etc.) then it should likewise be okay to deform humans by un-natural forces. This would be opposed by most and this opposition would rightly sit with the above mentioned definition of ethics. Does this make it right though? There is an air of a bourgeoisie, colonial, or even chauvinistic character in this definition. Let us look at another example.

There is much dispute over whether it is ethically correct to expose certain animals, such as apes, to laboratory tests for the benefit of humans. The most fundamental ethical claim put forward by those conducting these tests is that the creatures, while certainly being sentient, have no conception, or at least a very limited conception, of their future well being. They live in the here and now and that causing suffering to them is not upsetting the definition given above because their interests are not being inhibited. Remember, the claim is that they have a limited conception or none at all of their future so they therefore have no self interest. Can we extend this claim then to other sentient beings such as humans? When a human child is born it cannot identify itself with this world nor have an interest in its future. It can be argued, however, that the child will develop these characteristics with age. Sometimes, however, humans are born with, or develop, mental disorders where they cannot identify with their surroundings or with themselves and they have no conception of their interests or their future. Can, in this instance, humans be subjected to the sort of treatment that laboratory animals endure? Most people will argue that no matter what, humans cannot be tortured or undergo laboratory tests such as grafting an ear of another species on her back. Some will even state that euthanasia is ethically wrong in such a case. What is the basis for such an argument? Treating these humans in this way would certainly fit with the definition of ethics given above but most still object. This is obviously a case of 'humanism', stating that being human is the characteristic that provides us our ethical liberties and not something that makes us human.

How does this example of comparing lab animals with humans of similar mental capacities, whether right or wrong, relate to whether trees have rights you may ask? Well, the fact that trees seem to be outside the scope of ‘western’ ethics is an ideological distinction. The fact that the ethics we have in ‘western’ society derives from a post Socratic weltanschauung, by definition, cannot be thought of as universally relevant. Because some may think, according to their ideological heritage, that trees have no rights does not mean that all people think that trees have no rights. In traditional Indigenous Australian philosophy even rocks and other inanimate objects have rights; traditional Indigenous Australians act ‘ethically’ towards such objects. What makes someone human, makes them alive, makes them ethically valuable, is the same as what makes a tree a tree or a rock a rock; some inanimate objects and places are even considered more important than humans. I can just imagine a ‘western’ scientist saying we can torture humans but we mustn’t even look at that rock. What seems absurd to us may be undeniably true to others.

Do trees have rights? I think so. But my reason for this position is that my ideological position is different from the generic ‘western’ model presented above. It is the dominant ‘western’ scientific ideology that reduces ethical nature, the nature of life, to sentience, to consciousness. I believe that there is a uniting force, an anima if you will, that is common in all life; in humans, in animals, and in trees. The ethical rights I give myself and to other humans I extend to all that shares what I share. If you declare that the definition of ethics given above is what you believe then that is fine, however, please remember the heritage of that position and the validity of other ethical view points as well. After all, ‘western’ thought, including science, can be argued to be just another social construction.

References

Arbor, JL 1986, ‘Animal Chauvinism, Plant-Regarding Ethics and the Torture of Trees’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 335-339.

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[1] I’m not overly happy with the term ‘western’, I may have used ‘northern’ or something similar to describe the ideological system adhered to by the group in question, however, ‘western’ remains the most widely understood term in classifying this ideological system.

Islam Question

Explain why the Qur’an is so central to the life of the Muslim.

Islam extends itself throughout the world; it does not discriminate. It exists within the richest of the rich and the poorest of the poor nations, it exists simultaneously where ultra-liberal ideologies reside and amongst super-conservative dictatorships. Islam is present in all corners of the globe.

The uniting force within Islam, no matter whether one identifies as Sunni or Shia, or liberal or Sufi, is undoubtedly the Qur’an. Muslims believe that the Qur’an is the final revelation from God, known as Allah[1], to Muhammad thus superseding the Torah of Moses and the Gospels of Jesus (Crotty 2005, p.145). The word Qur’an means ‘recitation’ and the Qur’an as a book consists of 114 chapters, known as suras. Muslims assert that Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah and that the Qur’an is the preserved version of Allah’s directions to Muhammad through his ambassadors (Welch 1997, pp.164, 177).

The life of every Muslim contains five intrinsic rituals, the Pillars of Islam. The first ritual, shahada, is a public display of faith asserting that Allah is the only God and that Muhammad is God’s messenger. Both of these statements occur in the Qur’an (Welch 1997, p180). The second ritual, salat, is the earliest of all the Islamic rituals. It is a prayer given everyday, originally by Muhammad alone, but extended to the entire Islamic community in the Medinan sections of the Qur’an upon the creation of a new religious community (Welch 1997, pp.181-187). The third ritual, zakat, was fundamental in the development of an Islamic welfare system. It is a system of alms giving quite similar to a tax. The Qur’an states (2. 219/217) that the amount to be paid is your surplus (Welch 1997, pp.191-192).

The fourth ritual, fasting during the month of Ramadan is described by Welch (1997, p.192) as having its roots in a war victory in Ramadan to the Muslims. Fasting during this month is mentioned in numerous places in the Qur’an, most notably Sura 2. 185/181 and Sura 2. 187/183 (Welch 1997, p.192). The fifth ritual is a pilgrimage to the Hajj and corresponds with other rituals exercised along the journey. These rituals in full, apart from the first which is in segments, are found in the Qur’an.

These five Pillars of Islam illustrate the centrality of the Qur’an to the life of the Muslim. The Qur’an is a mirror of things past, historical events and sacred times associated with Islam such as the Muslim’s victory in Ramadan; a guide on how to conduct ones life in the present in accordance with the will of Allah; and presents insight into the future, giving certainty to the daily practices of Muslims. The Qur’an codifies the identity of the Muslim, it describes all that a Muslim is or should desire to be. The Qur’an defines and unites the Islamic community, not through a process of alterity but through quite the opposite. It is not apologetic. A passage highlighted by Crotty (2005, p.158) from the Universal Islamic Declaration, 1976 highlights this well:

Islam is a complete code of life suitable for all people and all times, and Allah’s mandate is eternal and universal and applies to every sphere of human conduct and life, without any distinction between the temporal and the spiritual.

With the influence of western ideologies and European colonial rule over many Islamic ‘nations’ in modern times many diverse and at times seemingly contradicting responses have occurred. Islamic nations have been established, many along western democratic guidelines while others advocate traditional and some times fundamental Islamic policies (Welch 1997, p.208). Some Islamic groups have dealt with this change by placing an emphasis, like Ibn-‘Adb-al-Wahhab[2], on removing any external influence upon Islam and focusing on the Fundamental principles of the Qur’an. Others, such as Muhammad ‘Abduh[3], maintained that rationalism and science were congenial with Islam and the Qur’an (Welch 1997, pp.208-213).

Islam has played witness to enormous change within the world having enormous outside pressures placed upon it at many points of history. While Islam itself has indeed modified itself to suit the beliefs, culture, and ideologies of those who follow its teachings; a Muslim, whether Sunni or Shia, or liberal or Sufi, still places the most fundamental importance of their identity and certainly their faith upon the Qur’an.

Bibliography

Crotty, R 2005, ‘Islam’, in Religion Studies: The Long Search Study Guide, University of South Australia, pp. 141-160.

Welch, AT 1997, ‘Islam’, in Hinnells, JR (ed.) 1997, The New Penguin Handbook of Living Religions, Penguin, Camberwell, pp. 162-235.

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[1] From al’ilah – ‘The God’. This became ‘Allah’ (Crotty 2005, p.141).

[2] Ibn-‘Adb-al-Wahhab was an Islamic reformer from Arabia (Welch 1997, p.210).

[3] Welch (1997, p.212) describes Muhammad ‘Abduh as a leading Egyptian modernist thinker. He died in 1905.